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I. INTRODUCTION

Conflicts of interest are a perpetual source of attorney liability and they
routinely threaten or impair clients' representations in almost all practice
areas.' Conflict of interest allegations are especially troublesome when
coupled with claimed violations of ethics rules, for it is there that they
most resonate with judges and juries. Some of the most serious
professional responsibility problems with which lawyers now struggle are
attributable to actual and potential conflicts of interest.2
In the last few years, lawyers and law firms have been subjected to
complaints alleging conflicts of interest by current and former clients who
are not directly opposed to one another in a pending matter.3 Instead, these
current and former clients contend that the lawyer or firm, in representing
another client, is taking a position in an unrelated matter adverse to the
complaining client's or former client's interests.4 This situation is perhaps
best understood by way of a litigation example.
Assume that Law Firm represents insurance companies in coverage and
bad faith litigation. Tapping into its expertise, one of Law Firm's corporate
clients asks it to represent the company in litigation with the company's
liability insurer. The insurer has refused to pay the company's
environmental response costs incurred from cleaning up pollution on the
company's property. The company contends that its response costs are
"damages" for purposes of its liability insurance policy.Because Law Firm has never represented its corporate client's insurer,
it sues the insurance company for breach of contract and bad faith for its
refusal to pay the environmental response costs at issue. One of Law
Firm's largest insurance company clients learns of the suit and demands
that Law Firm withdraw. The insurability of environmental response costs
is an issue of great concern to all property and casualty insurers; a verdict
or judgment for the corporate client in this case could result in disastrous
precedent. What is Law Firm to do?
Our hypothetical law firm has landed itself in what is commonly

1. Conflicts of interest may, for example, give rise to malpractice claims or suits; require
attorneys' disqualification or withdrawal from one or more representations; exacerbate malpractice
claims based primarily on other conduct; generate adverse publicity; or impair lawyers'
relationships with clients. See Robert E. O'Malley et al., Selected ConflictofInterest Issues, ALAS
LOSS PREVENTION J., Jan. 1992, 2, 16 (on file with author).
2. See John S. Dzienkowski, PositionalConflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 458
(1993).
3. See id. at459.
4. See id.
5. This is a recurring dispute between liability insurers and commercial insureds. See, e.g.,
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1997).
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described as an "issue" or "positional" conflict of interest. An issue or
positional conflict of interest arises when clients have opposing interests
in unrelated matters.' Though the clients' interests do not directly conflict,
they differ on what the law or public policy ought to be.7 The clients'
common lawyer is stranded between them, facing a representation at odds
with another position or interest that he represents.' Issue or positional
conflicts are especially sensitive if the parties confront the issue repeatedly
or routinely, and thus have long-term stakes in the subject.
The principle that lawyers may be prohibited from accepting new
matters or from continuing in representations because of issue or positional
conflicts of interest derives from a view of the law as something other than
deductive science. In other words, lawyers must be seen as shaping the
law, rather than simply aiding courts, clients and legislatures in arriving at
independent judgments or interpretations. A lawyer who advocates a
position for one client and the opposing position for another client in
unrelated matters necessarily does so to the clients' detriment.' The
lawyer's divided obligations may neutralize his effectiveness for one or
both clients by causing him to change his advice, unreasonably concede
positions, or underplay otherwise strong strategic hands."0 At least one
client seems sure to be harmed in such a situation."
The potential for issue or positional conflicts of interest is greatest in
litigation. Such a conflict arises in litigation when a lawyer argues for an
interpretation of the law on behalf of one client that is adverse to another
client's interests. Some substantive litigation areas seem predisposed to
issue or positional conflicts of interest, including antitrust law, insurance,
labor and employment law, products liability and professional liability.
This list certainly is not exhaustive, however, for evidentiary and
procedural issues of interest to many litigants transcend particular
substantive areas. An issue or positional conflict may arise in the
transactional context where a lawyer negotiates a deal or drafts a document
for one client that another client considers to be improper in whole or part.
For example, a law firm might include "poison pill" arrangements in a

6. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 460. Issue or positional conflicts are separate and
distinct from "procedural"conflicts, such as where two clients with congruent interests insist that
their common lawyer try their respective cases in different courts at the same time. See CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs § 7.3, at 355-56 (1986).
7. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WII.,AM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §
1.7:104, at 232.1 (2d ed. Supp.. 1998).
8. See Norman W. Spaulding, Note, The Prophetand the Bureaucrat:PositionalConflicts
in Service Pro-Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1395, 1400 (1998).
9. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:105, at 232.5-.7 (discussing hypothetical
positional conflict of interest).
10. See id. § 1.7:105, at 232.5.
11. See id. § 1.7:104, at 232.3.
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client's corporate documents that make the subject company less attractive
to potential purchasers, but which the firm's clients who typically look to
acquire companies consider illegal or improper.12 In the lobbying context,
an issue or positional conflict may arise where a lawyer argues for a
change in the law on behalf of one client that will detrimentally affect
another client. In fact, these areas frequently overlap, and it is difficult to
segregate issue or positional conflicts by practice area. Where these areas
overlap the common element usually is litigation.
Issue or positional conflicts of interest pose difficult practical and
philosophical questions. A lawyer's job is to advocate or promote any
viable interpretation of the law that benefits his client. This is the essence
of what lawyers do. 3 Clients' ability to insist on fidelity to their views
under threat of disqualification or the loss of business restricts lawyers'
freedom to practice.14 Giving clients unlimited veto power over their
lawyers' choice of other clients and matters eliminates the concept of
professional independence. Such conflicts may force practitioners to
unreasonably narrow their fields of expertise. A broad view of issue or
positional conflicts also penalizes those clients who may see their lawyers
disqualified or forced to withdraw because it deprives them of counsel of
their choosing. Clients seeking personal or competitive advantages should
not be allowed to subvert ethics rules related to conflicts of interest by
wielding them as procedural weapons.15
Despite the potentially serious problems they pose for lawyers and
clients alike, issue or positional conflicts of interest have received
relatively little scholarly attention. This Article represents a modest attempt
to explore this unappreciated and misunderstood ethics area. Part I
examines legal ethics rules as they relate to issue or positional conflicts,
focusing on Rules 1.7 and 1.9(a) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.16 Part I"discusses cases dealing with issue or positional conflicts

12. Poison pill arrangements essentially give a company's shareholders the right to purchase
a new type of preferred stock upon the occurrence of a specified event. See Dzienkowski, supra
note 2, at 468 n.42. For a discussion of conflicts of interest and the ethical implications of poison
pills, seeCatherineR. Phillips, Comment, EthicalConflicts in the RecommendationofPoisonPills,
65 WASH. U. L.Q. 273 (1987).
13. See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Prof'l Guidance Comm., Op. 89-27 (1990) (discussing issue
or positional conflicts in litigation).
14. See Spaulding, supra note 8, at 1408-09 (noting that clients' market power gives them
a powerful mechanism for enforcing their concepts of positional loyalty).
15. See Berry v. Saline Mem'l Hosp., 907 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Ark. 1995) (recognizing this
problem generally); Adam v. MacDonald Page & Co., 644 A.2d 461,464 (Me. 1994) (discussing
ethics rules related to confidentiality and noting that motions to disqualify counsel can be abused
as a litigation tactic).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1999) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
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of interest. There are, unfortunately, few cases on point.17 Finally, Part IV
approaches issue or positional conflicts of interest from a practical
standpoint.
11. ETHIcs RULES AND ISSUE OR POSmONAL
CoNFLIcTs OF INTEREST

Ethics codes for lawyers are a relatively recent creation.18 Alabama
adopted the first ethics code in 1887.19 The American Bar Association
(ABA) first adopted a code of ethics in 1908.20 The CanonsofProfessional
Ethics, as they were known, guided lawyers until 1969, when the ABA
21The Model Code
adopted the Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibility.
took effect January 1, 1970,22 and all states adopted it in some form shortly
thereafter.
Unfortunately, the Model Code was deficient in a number of respects
and the ABA began work on new ethics guidelines less than seven years
after the Code took effect.2 3 In 1983, after several years of effort, the ABA
adopted the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct.2 4 The Model Rules are
now the predominant ethics standards for lawyers.' At least forty states
and the
District of Columbia have adopted the Model Rules in some
form.26

17. See WOLFRAM, supra note 6, § 7.3, at 355.
18. See Douglas R. Richmond, Associates as Snitches and Rats, 42 WAYNE L. REV.
1819, 1824(1997).
19. See Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
ImproprietyStandardto Prosecutors,63 Mo. L. REV. 699,707 (1998).
20. See MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Preface.
21. See MODELCODE OFPROFESSIONALRESPONSBIHTY (1986) [hereinafter MODELCODE].
22. See id.
23. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 4-5
(5th ed. 1998).
24. See MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Preface.
25. In contrast to the Model Code, which states adopted with little orno modification, many
states disagreed with various provisions of the Model Rules. As a result, some states continue to
follow their versions of the Model Code. See LENBIERNAT&R. HUNTERMANSON, LEGALETHICS
IOR MANAGEMENT AND THEIR COUNSEL 12 (1997). For example, New York, with about 10% of
America's lawyers, still follows the Model Code. See GILLERS, supra note 23, at 5. Some states
have crafted their own ethics rules. See Adam v. MacDonald Page & Co., 644 A.2d 461,463 n.6
(Me. 1994) (suggesting that as of 1994, seven states employed their own standards). California,
with about one-sixth of the nation's lawyers, has borrowed modestly from the Model Rules, but its
ethics rules are largely its own. See GILIERS, supra note 23, at 5.
26. See GHlIMRs, supra note 23, at 5 (indicating that forty states had adopted the Model Rules
in some form as of January 1998); Richmond, supra note 18, at 1822 n.12 (stating that the District
of Columbia has adopted the Model Rules).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 1
FLORIDA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 51

A. Conflicts of InterestInvolving CurrentClients
The Model Rules recognize that loyalty is essential to attorney-client
relationships.' The principle that client loyalty is paramount is embodied
in Rule 1.7,28 which provides:
(a)

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2)
each client consents after consultation.

(b)

A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, orby the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1)
the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected;
and
(2)
the client consents after consultation. When
representation of multiple clients in a single
matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and
risks involved.29

Rule 1.7 clearly addresses conflicts involving current clients. That is,
it addresses the balancing of interests required in concurrent
representations. The Rule applies both when the representation of a client
is directly adverse to another client,3" and when a client's representation
would be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person.3" Rule 1.7 thus recognizes the basic principle

27. See MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7 cmt. 1.
28. See Lawrence J. Fox, Litigation Conflicts: Is it Time to Revive the Appearance of
Impropriety?,PROF. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 1, 8 (arguing that Rule 1.7 and related rules "are the way
the profession has chosen to embody the principle of client loyalty").
29. MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7.
30. See, e.g., Smiley v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs, 984 F.2d 278,
282 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding concurrent workers' compensation representations were directly
adverse to one another); Florida Bar v. Mastrilli, 614 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1993) (suspending
lawyer for violating Rule 1.7(a) by suing a current client); In re Horine, 661 N.E.2d 1206, 1207
(Ind. 1996) (reprimanding lawyer for violating Rule 1.7(a) by negotiating the sale of a client's car
to another client without first obtaining the purchaser's consent to the representation).
31. See, e.g., Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987) (disqualifying lawyers

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss3/1
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that a lawyer's duty of loyalty is indivisible.32
Although Model Rules 1.7(a) and (b) both address current client
conflicts, meaning concurrent representations, they impose different
standards. Rule 1.7(a) deals with clients' direct adversity; hence, this
subsection is especially stringent." In many cases it amounts to a per se
disqualification rule,' or an absolute ban on accepting a second
representation. Rule 1.7(b), on the other hand, applies where a lawyer's
representation of a client may be "materially limited" by competing
interests." This requires more subtle inquiry. Thus, while Rule 1.7(b) may
be broader than Rule 1.7(a), it also is more flexible and forgiving. 6
In order to accept or continue a representation in the shadow of Rule
1.7, a lawyer must reasonably believe that he can fulfill his professional
obligations to the client notwithstanding his competing obligations or
interests. The "reasonable belief' requirement in Rules 1.7(a) and (b)
makes clear that the standard by which a lawyer must measure his fidelity
or loyalty is an objective one.37 Consistent with the employment of an
objective standard, a lawyer's belief may be inferred from the
circumstances."
Conflicts of interest under Rule 1.7, of course, can be cured or avoided.
A lawyer may ask both clients to consent to the dual representation.39
Client consent may be requested only after "consultation," however, which
Rule 1.7 contemplates as full disclosure by the lawyer of all advantages,
risks and implications attending the dual representation.' Just as a court
or ethics authority might infer from the circumstances that a lawyer's belief
about his ability to represent a client unimpaired by competing obligations
or interests is unreasonable. A fact finder also may infer that a client's
consent is the product of inadequate information. 1

who represented classes with differing interests relative to state property and expenditure of state
funds); People v. Ginsberg, 967 P.2d 151,153 (Colo. 1998) (suspendinglawyer who prepared loan
documents in transaction in which both borrower and lender were his clients).
32. See Smiley, 984 F.2d at 282 (stating that an attorney owes a client a "duty of undivided
loyalty"); Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950,953 (Cal. 1994) (stating that "[ain attorney's duty
of loyalty to a client is not one that is capable of being divided").
33. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:201, at 232.12.
34. See id.
35. MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7(b).
36. See 1 HAZARD &HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:301, at 250-51.
37. See People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 133, 136 (Colo. 1997).
38. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:206, at 238.
39. See MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rules 1.7(a) & 1.7(b) (providing for client consent).
40. See Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n, v. Carey Canada, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 255, 259 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (discussing Model Rule 1.7(a)); Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 845 (D.C. 1994) (stating
that "[a]fter full disclosure of the differing interests, all potentially affected clients must consent to
the representation").
41. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:206, at 238.
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Any analysis of issue or positional conflicts of interest intuitively
begins either with the "directly adverse" language of Rule 1.7(a) or with
the "materially limited" qualifier in Rule 1.7(b). But courts' and lawyers'
intuition may be wrong, for the comment to Rule 1.7 appears to treat issue
or positional conflicts separately, if not haphazardly. A comment to the
Rule states:
A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions
on a legal question that has arisen in different cases, unless
representation of either client would be adversely affected.
Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in
cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper
to do so in cases pending at the same time in an appellate
court. 4 2

The comment's language is troublesome for several reasons. First, it
suggests that issue or positional conflicts are restricted to litigation.
Though such conflicts are most acute in litigation, they are not so limited.43
Second, the comment misapprehends the problem even within the confines
of litigation. The comment implies that disqualifying or otherwise serious
conflicts occur only when a lawyer handles concurrent cases in a single
appellate court.' The comment's distinction between trial and appellate
courts apparently turns on notions of stare decisis.45 In the federal system,
however, trial court decisions are routinely reported and are cited as
persuasive authority in other district courts, and in federal and state
appellate courts around the country. Even state trial court decisions may
influence other courts in the same jurisdiction. The trial-versus-appellate
court distinction, therefore, is fundamentally flawed. 46 The single appellate
court approach also is flawed, for courts often look to other jurisdictions
for precedent. Third, the "adversely affect" qualifier does not track the
language of either Rule 1.7(a) (which applies in instances of direct
adversity) or Rule 1.7(b) (which speaks of material limitations). This
ambiguity arguably vests greater discretion in lawyers when it comes to
determining their professional obligations vis-a-vis effects on clients and

42. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7 cmt. 9.
43. See generally Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 466-69.
44. According to the comment, "it is ordinarily not improper" for a lawyer to take
antagonistic legal positions in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so "in cases
pending at the same time in an appellate court." MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7 cmt. 9.
45. See WOLFRAM, supra note 6, § 7.3, at 355 n.41.
46. At least one state ethics authority has recognized that issue or positional conflicts of
interest can arise out of trial court representations. See State Bar of N.M., Advisory Opinions
Comm., Advisory Op. 1990-3 (1990).
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consent than the Rule itself allows.47
The ABA analyzed issue or positional conflicts of interest in a 1993
ethics opinion.48 In Formal Opinion 93-377, the ABA's Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility was presented with
the following question:
[W]hether a lawyer can represent a client with respect to a
substantive legal issue when the lawyer knows that the
client's position on that issue is directly contrary to the
position being urged by the lawyer (or the lawyer's firm) on
behalf of
49 another client in a different, and unrelated, pending
matter.
The Committee limited its inquiry to issue or positional conflicts
involving currentclients. The Committee reasoned thatformerclients are
not affected by, nor can they be instigators of, issue or positional conflicts
of interest because they are not threatened by a lawyer's potentially diluted
advocacy in the eyes of a court, stare decisis, or divided loyalties.51 All of
these issues may be of great concern to current clients."
The Committee first looked to Rule 1.7 to answer the question posed,
and then examined the comment discussed above. 3 The Committee saw
no reason to distinguish between trial and appellate courts as the comment
requires, reasoning that trial court precedent and trial judges' perceptions
are significant concerns.5 The Committee thus concluded that if two
matters are being litigated in the same jurisdiction, and the lawyer's
representation of one client will create legal precedent (even if nonbinding) which is likely to "materially undercut" the legal position being
urged on behalf of a second client, the lawyer must either decline the
second representation or withdraw from the first unless both clients
consent to the concurrent representation.5
If the two conflicting matters are not being litigated in the same forum,
the lawyer still must determine "fairly and objectively" whether his
representation of one client will be materially limited by his representation

47. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 473.
48. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993)
[hereinafter Formal Op. 93-377].
49. Id. at 1 (footnote omitted).
50. See id. at 1-2.
51. See id. at 2. The Committee did not clearly express this reasoning, instead preferring a
simple citation to Rule 1.9 cmt. 2. See id.
52. See Formal Op. 93-377, supra note 48, at 2.
53. See id. at 2-3.
54. See id. at 3.
55. Id. at 3-4.
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of the other.56 In making that determination, the lawyer must consider
(a) whether the issue is of such importance that its determination is likely
to affect the ultimate outcome of at least one of the cases, and whether its
determination actually will have that effect; or (b) whether the lawyer will

be inclined to alter his arguments for one or both clients, or de-emphasize
or "soft-pedal" certain arguments or issues which he would otherwise
vigorously pursue so as to avoid affecting or impairing the other case.5 7
If the lawyer determines that the issue or point of contention impairs his
concurrent representations either because it will affect the ultimate
outcome of one or both cases, or because his dual representation will
impair his effectiveness as an advocate, he should decline the second
representation. In such a situation the representation of at least one client
would be "adversely affected" if the lawyer were to proceed with both.59
If, on the other hand, the lawyer reasonably believes that the issue being
debated will not determine the ultimate outcome in the second case and

that his concurrent representation will not diminish the quality or
effectiveness of his services, he may continue to represent both clients.'
In order to continue his dual representation, however, the lawyer must
obtain both clients' consent. This requires the lawyer to fully disclose to
both clients all potential ramifications of the joint representation.61

56. Id. at 4.
57. MaThe Committee divided these two general elements into four questions which, when
paired, become quite close.
(a) Is the issue one of such importance that its determination is likely to affect the
ultimate outcome of at least one of the cases?
(b) Is the determination of the issue in one case likely to have a significant impact
on the determination of that issue in the other case? (For example, does the
issue involve a new or evolving area of the law, where the first case decided
may be regarded as persuasive authority by other courts, regardless of their
geographical location? Or: is the issue one of federal law, where the decision
by one federal judge will be given respectful consideration by another federal
judge, even though they are not in the same district or state?)
(c) Will there be any inclination by the lawyer, or her firm to "soft-pedal" or deemphasize certain arguments or issues-which otherwise would be vigorously
pursued-so as to avoid impacting the other case?
(d) Will there be any inclination within the firm to alter any arguments for one,
or both clients, so that the firm's position in the two cases can be
reconciled-and, if so, could that redound to the detriment of one of the
clients?
Id.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id.
Id. at 4-5.
See id. at 5.
See id.
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Recognizing that its analysis and discussion was predicated on the
assumption that the issue or positional conflict of interest is immediately
apparent to the lawyer when he is asked to represent the second client, the
Committee went on to state that the same approach should guide a lawyer
when a conflict emerges after he accepts the second representation. 2 If the
lawyer concludes that he cannot proceed with both representations after
accepting the second, he must withdraw from one of them.63 If possible,
the lawyer should determine which client will suffer the least harm as a
result of his withdrawal and then withdraw from that representation.'
In reaching its conclusions, the Committee disregarded Rule 1.7(a) and
instead focused on Rule 1.7(b). 65 The Committee reasoned that Rule 1.7(a)
does not apply to issue or positional conflicts of interest because by
referring to "directly adverse" representations it contemplates the
simultaneous representation of opposing clients.' The test under
Rule 1.7(b), however, is whether the representation of a client in one
matter may be "materially limited" by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client in another matter.67 The Committee viewed the impairment
of a representation by way of an issue or positional conflict as a material
limitation within the meaning of Rule 1.7(b).
Formal Opinion 93-377 is significant because the Committee
broadened issue or positional conflicts of interest to cover litigation at the
trial court level and to encompass cases in different jurisdictions. The
opinion also is significant because the Committee offered a workable
framework for analyzing issue or positional conflicts.
At least one state has rejected the ABA approach to issue or positional
conflicts, 6' although the related ethics opinion may not travel well. The
Professional Ethics Commission of the Maine Bar was posed this general
question:
The lawyer represents one client who is a party in Lawsuit A,
and a second client who is a party in Lawsuit B. The two
lawsuits are unrelated except that they present the same legal
issue. The clients' interests are conflicting in the sense that
they desire opposite resolutions of the same issue. The lawyer
proposes to represent both clients, thereby causing the lawyer
simultaneously to advocate opposing positions on the

62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at n.6.

65. See id. at 4 n.4.
66. See MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7(b).
67. See Formal Op. 93-377, supra note 48, at 4 n.4.
68. See Board of Overseers of the Bar, Prof'l Ethics Comm'n, Op. No. 155 (Me. 1997)
[hereinafter Maine Op. No. 155].
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common legal issue.
Bar Counsel inquires into whether and under what
circumstances the representation could create a conflict of
interest under the [Maine] Bar Rules. 69
In formulating its answer, which it offered in Opinion No. 155, the
Commission looked first to its definition of "conflict of interest" found in
Maine Bar Rule 3.4(b)(1). That Rule provides:
Representation would involve a conflict of interest if there is
a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of one client
would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's
or to a
duties to another current client, to a former [client],
70
interest.
own
lawyer's
the
by
or
person,
third
The question, then, was whether the issue or positional conflict described
was in fact a conflict of interest within the meaning of Bar Rule 3.4(b)(1).71
The Commission concluded that "an 'issue conflict,' without more, is
not a conflict of interest" under Maine Bar Rules.72 It rejected the ABA's
view of issue or positional conflicts because the Maine Bar Rules do not
include a comment similar to that accompanying Model Rule 1.7.73 A note
to a Maine Bar Rule specifically states that a conflict should not be found
to exist solely because a lawyer might be required to advance clients'
contradictory positions in unrelated proceedings.74 Finally, the
Commission believed that recognizing issue or positional conflicts posed
an unreasonable burden on practitioners, especially in light of the
perceived rarity of such conflicts.
[A]doption of the ABA position would necessarily imply that

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 1.
Id. (quoting Maine Bar Rule 3.4(b)(1)).
See id.
Id. at 4.
See id. at 3. Comment 9 to Model Rule 1.7 states:
A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question
that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client would be
adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to assert such positions in
cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases
pending at the same time in an appellate court.

MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7 cmt. 9. This comment is discussed in the text accompanying
supra notes 42-47.
74. See Maine Op. No. 155, supra note 68, at 4.
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law firms must use the conflict screening procedures for
"issue conflicts" that are used for customary direct conflicts.
Development of such an issue conflict warning system is,
however, a far more formidable task, even for a firm of
moderate size, than determining whether a prospective
opponent is also a client in an unrelated matter. We decline to
interpret [Maine] Bar Rule 3.4(b)(1) in such a way as to
require the bar to adopt screening procedures for issue
conflicts which experience tells us are, in any event,
extremely rare.75
The Maine approach seems unlikely to influence other jurisdictions.
Maine Bar Rules differ appreciably from the Model Rules. States that have
adopted Rule 1.7 and the comments in whole or substantial part are
unlikely to be persuaded by the Commission's reasoning, inasmuch as the
absence of a like rule or similar commentary so influenced it. The
Commission arguably afforded excessive weight to the potential burden on
lawyers that screening issue or positional conflicts among current clients
might pose, or it at least ascribed such a burden without sufficient
analysis.76 Many law firms claim to successfully screen potential issue or
positional conflicts of interest. 77 Finally, the Commission noted that an
issue or positional conflict might become an actual conflict of interest
under Maine law given the correct facts and circumstances.78 In other
words, the general question posed to the Commission might be answered
differently if the lawyer caught in an issue or positional conflict found his
effectiveness on his clients' behalf impaired as a result.7 9
B. Former Clients and Conflicts of Interest
Because former clients freely voice their concerns about issue or
positional conflicts of interest, courts and lawyers must consider the
application of Model Rule 1.9. Rule 1.9 concerns loyalty in successive

75. Id.

76. Similarly, a California ethics committee concluded that even sophisticated conflict
checking systems in law firms are unable to identify issue or positional conflicts, such that
established conflict of interest principles should not apply in this context. See State Bar of Cal.,
Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-108 (1989).
77. My support for this statement is anecdotal. Itis drawn mainly from communications with
lawyers whose firms are insured by the Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc. (ALAS). These
lawyers' claims and statements may or may not be accurate or reliable. My point, quite simply, is
that the California and Maine assumptions of practical impossibility are not necessarily accurate.
I believe that it is practically impossible to screen issue or positional conflicts in successive
representations. See infra Part IV.A.
78. See Maine Op. No. 155, supra note 68, at 4.

79. See id.
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representations; it is intended to protect former clients.8" The Rule
embodies the principle that loyalty to a client survives the termination of
the attorney-client relationship." Were it otherwise, a lawyer might be
tempted to terminate a representation and use his former client's
confidences to make himself more valuable to a new client who is adverse
to the first. The primary aim of Rule 1.9, then, is preventing the use of
former clients' confidences to their detriment.8 2
Rule 1.9(a) provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which that person's interests
are materially adverse to the interests of the former client
unless the former client consents after consultation. 3
"[A]nother person" as used in Rule 1.9(a) means "another client. '
The scope of a "matter" for Rule 1.9(a) purposes depends on the facts
of the particular situation or transaction. 5 Similarly, determining whether
matters are "substantially related" requires an analysis of the facts, the
circumstances, and the legal issues involved.86 The test for a substantial
relationship has sometimes been honed in practice to require a lawyer's
disqualification or withdrawal only where the issues in the current and
former representations are identical or essentially the same, or where the
relationship between the issues is patently clear.87 Such a narrow view of
whether matters are substantially related, however, is not universal.88 Many
80. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.9:101, at 289.
81. See GILLERS, supra note 23, at 303.
82. See Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 301 (Alaska 1997) (stating that the Rule 1.9(a)
substantial relationship test is a prophylactic rule obviating the former client's need to demonstrate
the disclosure of confidential information in the prior representation); Flatt v. Superior Court, 885
P.2d 950, 954 (Cal. 1994) (stating that "the chief fiduciary value jeopardized [in successive
representations] is that of client confidentiality"); State exreL Wal-Mart Stores,Inc. v. Kortum, 559
N.W.2d 496, 500-502 (Neb. 1997) (discussing substantial relationship test and confidentiality).
83. MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.9(a) (1998).
84. See Wood's Case, 634 A.2d 1340, 1342-43 (N.H. 1993).
85. See MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.9 cmt. 2; see also, e.g., Misemer v. Freda's
Restaurant, Inc., 961 S.W.2d 120, 122-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
86. See Schwartz v. Cortelloni, 685 N.E.2d 871,878-80 (111. 1997); State v. Crepeault, 704
A.2d 778,783 (Vt. 1997) (quoting State ex reL McClanahan v. Hamilton, 430 S.E.2d 569,572-73
(W. Va. 1993)).
87. See Bergeron v. Mackler, 623 A.2d 489,493-94 (Conn. 1993) (quoting Government of
India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978)).
88. See Chrispens v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., 897 P.2d 104, 111 (Kan. 1995) (asserting that
"[tihis approach has not been a view widely adopted"); Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal
Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 A.2d 755, 757 (N.H. 1996) (noting that "It]his approach has been
rejected by a majority of. . . courts").
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courts take a broader view by blending fact and issue comparisons. s9
Regardless of the approach chosen, or the view selected, the party claiming
a conflict of interest bears the burden of proving that the representations
are substantially related.'
Once matters are determined to be substantially related, Rule 1.9(a)
requires that the current client's and the former client's interests be
"materially adverse" in order to force the lawyer's disqualification or
withdrawal, or to require him to decline the second representation. The
materiality requirement suggests a conflict of interest continuum, with
some conflicts intense or severe and others minor or insignificant. 91 It is
perhaps more accurate to say that not all competing interests amount to a
conflict of interest; an actual conflict does not arise unless the material
adversity requirement is met. Of course, the difficulty for practitioners lies
not with recognizing and resolving obvious conflicts, but with those close
cases that present tough judgment calls and that test lawyers' discretion.'
Such cases are generally best resolved by erring on the side of caution.93
At first glance it appears that the "substantially related matter" and
"materially adverse" language found in Rule 1.9(a) may apply to issue or
positional conflicts of interest. A comment to Rule 1.9, however, restricts
the rule's application by defining the term "matter" so that "a lawyer who
recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded
from later representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of that
type even though the subsequent representation involves a position adverse
to the prior client." 94 Thus, Rule 1.9(a) as it is now interpreted does not
apply to claimed issue or positional conflicts of interest involving former
not be a surprise, for Rule 1.9(a) is intended to
clients. 95 This result should
96
applicable.
be narrowly

89. See Chrispens,897 P.2d at 111 (citing and quotingWestinghouseElec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 588 F.2d 221,225 (7th Cir. 1978)); see, e.g., State ex rel. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kortum,
559 N.W.2d 496,501 (Neb. 1997); West VirginiaCanine College, Inc. v. Rexroad, 444 S.E.2d 566,
570-71 (W. Va. 1994).
90. See State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630,633 (Fla. 1991); Schwartz
v. Cortelloni, 685 N.E.2d 871,877 (111. 1997); Richers v. Marsh &McLennan Group Assocs., 459
N.W.2d 478,481 (Iowa 1990).
91. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.9:202, at 306.5.
92. See id.
93. See id.

94. MODELRUES, supra note 16, Rule 1.9 cmt. 2.
95. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 480; see also I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7,
§ 1.9:202, at 306.5 (stating that representations presenting mere positional conflicts of interest
"should almost never be barred in the serial context").
96. See Kansas Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics Op. 94-11, at3 (1994); see also Casco N. Bank v. JBI
Assocs., 667 A.2d 856, 861 (Me. 1995) (interpreting equivalent Maine Bar Rule and explaining
need and reason for narrow construction).
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Ill. ISSUE OR POSmONAL CONFLICrS OF
INTEREST IN THE CASE LAW

Courts, commentators and disciplinary authorities typically view but
four cases as dealing with issue or positional conflicts of interest: Estates
Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,97 Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.," Fiandacav. Cunningham,99 and

Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz.1°° These cases are
discussed in order below.
Estates Theatres"° ' was an antitrust action in which the conflict of
interest was judged under the Model Code. In Estates Theatres, the
plaintiff, which owned the Utopia theater, sued a number of defendants for
allegedly conspiring against it in the distribution and exhibition of
movies. " Estates Theatres was represented by Joseph A. Ruskay, who was
also representing United Artists Theatre Circuit (UATC) in two
consolidated antitrust actions in the same judicial district. 3 The claims in
the Utopia and UATC actions were quite similar."° UATC operated a
competing theater called the Roosevelt." s
Some of the defendants in the Utopia case moved to disqualify Ruskay.
They argued that the interests of the Utopia and the Roosevelt were
antagonistic because the defendants were allegedly discriminating against
one of Ruskay's clients to the benefit of the other."° If the Utopia's owners
were to prevail in their case, they would be entitled to an injunction
preventing the defendants from engaging in any illegal conduct benefitting
the Roosevelt. 7 This conflict was accentuated by an antitrust suit brought
by the government against UATC.' 8 Among other things, evidence
unearthed in the Utopia action could hurt UATC in its defense of the
government action."' Finally, UATC would not consent to Ruskay's
continued representation of Estates Theatres." 0

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

345 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1987).
602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
Estate Theatres, 345 F. Supp. at 93.
See id. at 95-96.

103. See id. at 95.
104. See id at 96.

105. See id.
106. See id.

107. See id.
108. See id. at 96-97.
109. See id. at 97.
110. See id UATC originally consented to Ruskay's joint representation. See id. Since that

time, however, he had named UATC as a con-conspirator in the Estates Theatres case, although he
never named UATC as a defendant. See il Ruskay had led UATC to believe that he would not in
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Ruskay contended that there was no conflict of interest."1 More
particularly, he contended there was no substantial conflict of interest
because the alleged conspiracies in the different cases (including the
government actions) involved different periods of years.X12
The Estates Theatres court analyzed the conflict under Disciplinary
Rule (DR) 5-105(B) of the Model Code.113 The version of DR 5-105(B) in
effect at the time provided in pertinent part that a lawyer "'shall not
continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client... "' except in
certain consensual circumstances."1 4 The court reasoned that Ruskay could
not continue to represent Estates Theatres.
[C]onsiderations of public policy, no less than the client's
interests, require rigid enforcement of the rule against dual
representation where one client is likely to be adversely
affected by the lawyer's representation of another client and
where it appears he cannot exercise independent judgment
and vigorous advocacy on behalf of the one without injuring
the interests of the other. A lawyer should not be permitted to
put himself in a position where, even unconsciously he will
be tempted to "soft pedal" his zeal in furthering the interests
of one client in order to avoid an obvious clash with those of
another, at least in the absence of the express consent of both
clients. Such is the case here. 115
Moreover, to allow the plaintiff's lawyer to take the conflicting positions
sure to arise from the facts presented would impair the community's
confidence and respect in the bench and bar."6
There is some question as to whether Estates Theatresinvolved a true
issue or positional conflict of interest, or whether it was a case of direct
adversity.' 1 7 UATC's status as an alleged co-conspirator seems to

any way allege or suggest that it was involved in a conspiracy. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 98.
113. See id. at 95. The Model Code includes aspirational standards expressed as "Ethical
Considerations," and "black letter" requirements stated as "Disciplinary Rules." See Richmond,
supra note 18, at 1824-25.
114. Estates Theatres, 345 F. Supp. at 95 (quoting DR 5-105(B)). The ABA amended
DR 5-105(B) in 1974 to add the requirement that a lawyer could not continue multiple employment
where "it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests." MODEL CODE DR
5-105(B) & n.38.
115. Estates Theatres, 345 F. Supp. at 99 (footnotes omitted).
116. Seeid.
117. See Maine Op. No. 155, supra note 68, at 2 (arguing that the Estates Theatresdecision
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strengthen the argument that the two clients had directly opposing interests
in the same action or closely related actions. Regardless, the court's
sweeping language has diminished the value of the case; most scholars
consider it weakly grounded in professional responsibility law. 18
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.'19 has been
described as a "classic example" of an issue or positional conflict of
interest, 20 although the court treated it as a test of the bounds of the
attorney-client relationship. 2 ' Regardless of description, the underlying
ethics and conflict questions horribly frustrated the law firm involved."
In 1976 the prominent national law firm of Kirkland & Ellis (Kirkland)
filed an antitrust suit for Westinghouse, a major manufacturer of nuclear
reactors, against a number of domestic and foreign corporations interested
in various aspects of the uranium industry.'23 The suit was handled by
lawyers from Kirkland's Chicago office. Among the defendants were Gulf
Oil Corporation (Gulf), Kerr-McGee Corporation (Kerr-McGee) and Getty
Oil Corporation (Getty). Gulf, Kerr-McGee and Getty also were members
of the American Petroleum Institute (API).'" Their API membership was
significant because lawyers from Kirkland's Washington, D.C. office were
representing APIin sensitive, high-stakes antitrust matters at the same time
that the firm's Chicago office was prosecuting the uranium antitrust action
for Westinghouse against Gulf, Kerr-McGee and Getty. 5 API had
employed Kirkland to help it lobby against Congressional attempts to
break up its members, and to prohibit their ownership of alternative energy
sources in addition to oil and gas.126
In the course of its API representation, Kirkland received confidential
information from API members which it used to prepare a detailed public
report. 27 The report devoted considerable attention to the uranium
industry. 121 In particular, the report asserted that increased uranium prices
were the result of increasing demand, that oil companies' entry into
uranium production had stimulated competition, that the oil companies had

rests on "traditional conflict analysis resulting from the clients' directly opposing interests in the
outcome of a representation").
118. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 471-72.
119. 580 F.2d 1311 (lth Cir. 1978).
120. Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 466 (describing Westinghouse as a "classic example of a
hybrid lobbying positional conflict" of interest).
121. See Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1312.
122. SeeJAMESB. STWART, TEPARTNERS 152,186-97 (1983).
123. See Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1313.
124. See id. at 1312.
125. See id. at 1313.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 1313-14.
128. See iL
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no incentive to act in concert, and that the energy industry was generally
competitive 9
Kirkland's conflict of interest was, or should have been, obvious. To
begin with, the firm was prosecuting Westinghouse's antitrust action
against the oil companies.13 In that suit, Westinghouse charged that the oil
companies' unfair and anticompetitive practices had altered uranium prices
to the point that it was commercially impracticable for Westinghouse to
honor many of its utility contracts.131 At the same time, Kirkland was
advocating API's position that oil companies' entry into alternative energy
markets was pro-competitive and that the uranium price increases that
Westinghouse deemed ruinous were merely the result of market forces.132
If the court hearing the antitrust action were to adopt the API report,
Westinghouse would surely lose its case. And, API's lobbying efforts
certainly would be undercut-and the accuracy and truthfulness of its
report questioned-were Congressional staffers to learn of the allegations
made in the Westinghouse suit. API's interests and Westinghouse's
interests clearly were adverse, even though API's forum was the halls of
Congress and Westinghouse was making its arguments in a federal district
court.
Gulf, Kerr-McGee and Getty moved to disqualify Kirkland in the
antitrust action, arguing that their membership in the API and their
disclosure of confidential information to Kirkland created an attorneyclient relationship with the firm.133 Kirkland contended that it never shared
an attorney-client relationship with individual API members.1 "4 It also
argued that the oil companies were aware that it was representing
Westinghouse at the same time it was representing API,13 and that its
construction of a "'Chinese wall,"' or wall of insulation, between the
Chicago attorneys representing Westinghouse and the Washington
attorneys representing API cut against disqualification. 36 Perhaps
recognizing the diametrically opposing positions asserted in the
Westinghouse suit and the API report, Kirkland did not dispute the oil
companies' charges that the firm had taken inconsistent positions on
competition in the uranium industry.3 7
129. See id. at 1314.
130. See id. at 1313.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1312, 1314-22.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1321. Kirkland contended that the oil companies had to know of the firm's
Westinghouse representation because it propounded discovery to them. See id.
136. ld.
137. See id. at 1314 (quoting WestinghouseElec. Corp. v. Rio AlgumLtd.,448 F.Supp. 1284,
1296 (N.D. ILL.), rev'd, 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978)).
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The district court declined to disqualify Kirkland and the oil companies
appealed. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The
Westinghouse court found that Kirkland's representation of the API created
a fiduciary relationship or implied professional relationship between the
law firm and the oil companies. 3 This relationship was largely (if not
exclusively) the product of the oil companies' disclosure of confidential
information to Kirkland in the firm's API representation. 3 9
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Westinghouse should have the
option of dismissing Gulf, Kerr-McGee and Getty from the antitrust suit,
or dismissing Kirkland as its counsel in that case."4 The court apparently
gave Westinghouse this option in order to avoid or mitigate any hardship
that it would likely suffer were Kirkland simply disqualified.141
Westinghouse evidences the practical problems that issue or positional
conflicts pose for lawyers. The Kirkland lawyer who opened the API
matter, Frederick Rowe, circulated a firm-wide memorandum in an attempt
to detect potential conflicts of interest, but none of his Chicago partners
representing Westinghouse recognized the conflict. 42 The case also
illustrates the personal toll that conflicts of interest sometimes take.
Kirkland made Rowe a scapegoat for the conflict and forced him to resign
his firm leadership position under threat of partnership expulsion. 43
The Seventh Circuit's approach to Kirkland's dual representation is
interesting, because the court did not decide Westinghouse as an issue or
positional conflict of interest. The court must have assumed that issues or
positional conflicts do not exist, or at least do not warrant offending
lawyers' disqualification, as indicated by its decision to stretch the
definition of "client" to allow the oil companies to claim a conflict
between current clients in substantially related matters.' Some scholars
have understandably accepted the Seventh Circuit's characterization of
Westinghouse as a simultaneous representation of directly adverse interests
as a result. 45 For those who choose to view the case as an issue or
positional conflict, it demonstrates quite clearly the danger that such
conflicts pose. Treating Westinghouse as an issue or positional conflict

138. See id. at 1319-21.

139. See id. at 1321.
140. See id. at 1322.
141. See id.
142. See STEWART, supra note 122, at 187.
143. See id. at 194.

144. See Westinghouse,580 F.2d at 1320-22. By representing an association a lawyer does not
necessarily enter into an attorney-client relationship with each member. See ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-365, at 2 (1992). That having been said, the ABA
accepts the Westinghouse position that an association member may become a client of the
association's lawyer if the member shares confidential information with lawyer. See id. at 2-3, 6.
145. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.10:204, at 329.
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case makes for better professional responsibility law, inasmuch as repeated
stretches of the terms "client" and "matter" to resolve claimed conflicts in
clients' favor will leave those definitions so loose as to create an
unreasonable and undesirable number of conflicts of interest. 146 Thus,
while the case was rightly decided without regard for its characterization,
the Westinghouse court's approach has a negative glare not seen if the case
is viewed as an issue or positional conflict.
Fiandacav. Cunningham47 involved a class action brought by female
inmates in the New Hampshire prison system. 148 The female inmates
challenged the state's failure to establish a facility for female inmates with
149
programs and services equivalent to those provided to male inmates.
They were represented in their challenge by New Hampshire Legal
Assistance (NHLA). 50° NHLA was, at the same time, representing a class
of plaintiffs (the Garrityclass) challenging the conditions and practices at
the Laconia State School and Training Center (Laconia), New Hampshire's
sole facility for the care of its mentally retarded citizens.'
The state ultimately offered to settle the female inmates' class action.
As part of the settlement, it proposed to establish a temporary correctional
facility on the grounds at Laconia."5 2 The inmate class plaintiffs rejected
the settlement offer because they did not want to accept an offer which
they considered to be contrary to the stated interests of the Garrityclass
plaintiffs. 53 The state immediately moved to disqualify NHLA as
plaintiffs' counsel in the inmate class action "due to the unresolvable
conflict of interest inherent in the NHLA's representation of two classes
with directly adverse interests. 154 The district court declined to disqualify
NHLA and the state appealed.'
The First Circuit Court of Appeals found "considerable merit" in the
state's conflict of interest argument.1 6 The court observed:
As [inmate] class counsel, NHLA owed plaintiffs a duty of
undivided loyalty: it was obligated to present the [state's
settlement] offer to plaintiffs, to explain its costs and benefits,
and to ensure that the offer received full and fair

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 467 n.38.
827 F.2d 825 (lst Cir. 1987).
See id. at 826.
See id.
See id.
Seeid. at 826-27.
See id. at 827.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 828.
Il at 829.
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consideration by the members of the class. Beyond all else,
NHLA had an ethical duty to prevent its loyalties to other
clients from coloring its representation of the [inmate]
plaintiffs in this action and from infringing upon the exercise
of its professional judgment and responsibilities.
NHLA, however, also represents the [Laconia] residents...
who are members of the plaintiff class in Garrity .... [T]his
group vehemently opposes the idea of establishing a
correctional facility for female inmates anywhere on the
grounds of [Laconia]. As counsel for the Garrityclass, NHLA
had an ethical duty to advance the interests of the class to the
fullest possible extent and to oppose any settlement of the
[female inmate class action] that would compromise those
interests. In short, the combination of clients and
circumstances placed NHLA in the untenable position of
being simultaneously obligated to represent vigorously the
interests of two conflicting clients. It is inconceivable that
NHLA, or any other counsel, could have properly performed
the role of "advocate" for both [the inmate] plaintiffs and the
Garrityclass, regardless of its good faith or high intentions.'57
The Fiandacacourt analyzed NHLA's alleged conflict of interest under
the New Hampshire equivalent of Model Rule 1.7(b).158 The court
concluded that NHLA's representation of the female inmate class "could
not escape the adverse affects" of its loyalties to the plaintiffs in the
Garrityclass. 15 9 The court thus held that NHLA had to be disqualified as
counsel for the inmate class. 16
Fiandacais not a pure issue or positional conflict because the two class
actions in which NHLA found itself entangled were not unrelated. At the
same time, NHLA's clients were not directly adverse, and the court
therefore properly looked to Rule 1.7(b) as a conduct measure, rather than
looking to Rule 1.7(a). The court's reasoning and analysis directly apply
to issue or positional conflicts of interests in litigation. For this reason,
Fiandacais a significant case.
The plaintiff in MaritransGP Inc. v. Pepper,Hamilton & Scheetz'
was a Philadelphia-based transporter of petroleum products operating
along the East and Gulf coasts. 62 Maritrans competed in a marine
transportation business with other tug and barge companies, some of which
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. (footnote omitted).
See id. at 829-30.
Id. at 830.
See id. at 831.
602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
See id. at 1280.
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were based in New York.'63 Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz (Pepper) was
Maritrans' long-time labor counsel."M Pepper also handled Maritrans'
corporate and securities work.65 Maritrans' chief labor attorney at Pepper
was Anthony Messina (Messina)."6
During the course of its labor representation of Maritrans, Pepper
became intimately familiar with Maritrans' operations and financial
information. 67 Messina obtained this information for the purpose of
developing Maritrans' labor goals and strategies. 6 '
Pepper and Messina... came to know the complete innerworkings of the company along with Maritrans' long-term
objectives, and competitive strategies in... the area of labor
costs, a particularly sensitive area in terms of effective
competition. In furtherance of its ultimate goal of obtaining
more business than... its competition, including the New
York-based companies, Maritrans analyzed each of its
competitors with Pepper and Messina. These analyses
included an evaluation of each competitor's strengths and
weaknesses, and of how Maritrans deals with its
competitors. 169

Pepper and Messina subsequently began representing Maritrans' New
York competitors in their labor negotiations with a different union. 70 The
New York companies sought wage and benefit reductions in order to
compete more effectively. 7 1 One of their competitors, of course, was
Maritrans. In September 1987, Maritrans learned from independent sources
that Pepper and Messina were representing four of its New York
competitors. 172 Maritrans objected to Pepper's representation of its
competitors. Pepper and Messina took the position that the situation
presented "'a business conflict, not a legal conflict,"' and that they owed
Maritrans no ethical or fiduciary duty prohibiting their representation of
the New York companies.' 73
Pepper proposed to Maritrans that it would continue as Maritrans'
counsel, but that it would not represent any more New York companies
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1281.
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beyond the four it already represented. 7 4 Messina would act as counsel for
the New York companies while two other Pepper attorneys would counsel
Maritrans. The Pepper attorneys on one side of the "Chinese Wall" would
not discuss their respective representations with the attorneys on the other
side.' 5 Maritrans agreed to this arrangement because it believed that it was
the only way to prevent Pepper from representing yet more of its
competitors, and especially its largest competitor, Bouchard Transportation
Company (Bouchard).'76 Without Maritrans' knowledge, Messina then
"parked" Bouchard and another New York competitor, Eklof, with Vincent
Pentima (Pentima), a friend and labor lawyer at another firm.' 7 7 Messina
was simultaneously negotiating Pentima's lateral move to Pepper.'78
On November 5,1987, Maritrans' executives met with Pepper attorneys
to discuss Maritrans' plans and strategies in the event of a strike against the
New York companies. 179 On December 2, 1987, Pepper terminated its
representation of Maritrans in all matters.80 Pepper began representing
Maritrans' remaining New York competitors later that month.'' In January
1988, Pentima joined Pepper as a partner, bringing his clients Bouchard
and Eklof with him. 82 In February 1988, Maritrans sued Pepper and
Messina in a Pennsylvania state court.'83
Maritrans alleged Pepper's misappropriation of its trade secrets, breach
of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and sought injunctive relief as
well as money damages.' 84 The trial court entered a preliminary injunction
and Pepper appealed. 8 ' An intermediate appellate court reversed,
concluding that Pepper's conduct was not actionable. The Superior Court
held that Rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional
Conduct on which Maritrans and the trial court relied did not create a cause
of action.' 86

174. Id.
175. See id. If Pepper truly meant to erect a "Chinese wall" or a "wall of insulation," it forgot
to read the blueprints. The wall Pepper built placed Messina on the side with the New York
companies, instead of on Maritrans' side where he rightly belonged.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 572 A.2d 737,739 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990), rev'd,602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
185. See id.
186. See Maritrans,602 A.2d at 1282. This would appear to be the general rule. See, e.g.,
Ex ParteToler, 710 So. 2d 415,416 (Ala. 1998) (interpreting Alabama statute); Davis v. Findley,
422 S.E.2d 859, 860-61 (Ga. 1992); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 918 P.2d 1274, 1288 (Kan.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court.187 The
Maritranscourt first observed that attorneys owe fiduciary duties to their
clients, and that their failure to perform these duties is actionable.188
Threatened failure to perform a fiduciary duty gives rise to a claim for
injunctive relief to prevent the threatened breach.'89 The court reasoned
that the lower appellate court "emasculated these common law principles,
in effect turning the ethical or disciplinary rules governing lawyers into a
grant of civil immunity" for reprehensible conduct.' 9° Adherence to
attorneys' fiduciary duties is necessary to ensure "that clients will feel
secure that everything they discuss with counsel will be kept in
confidence."''
Pepper and Messina argued that the trial court's order enjoining them
from representing Maritrans' competitors was an abuse of discretion.192 At
the time the injunction was entered there was no evidence that they had
revealed Maritrans' confidences to its competitors, or even that any
revelations were threatened. 93 The Maritranscourt rejected this argument.
Whether a fiduciary can later represent competitors or
whether a law firm can later represent competitors of its
former client is a matter that must be decided from case to
case and depends on a number of factors. One factor is the
extent to which the fiduciary was involved in its former
client's affairs. The greater the involvement, the greater the
danger that confidences (where such exist) will be
revealed . . . .Pepper and Messina's involvement was
extensive as was their knowledge of sensitive information
provided to them by Maritrans. We do not wish to establish
a blanket rule that a law firm may not later represent the
economic competitor of a former client in matters in which
the former client is not also a party to a law suit. But
situations may well exist where the danger of revelation of the
confidences of a former client is so great that injunctive relief
is warranted. This is one of those situations."
The court concluded that Pepper and Messina could be enjoined from

1996); Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 837 (R.I. 1997); Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409,
414 (Utah, 1998).
187. See Maritrans,602 A.2d at 1288.
188. See id. at 1283.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 1286.
193. See id.
194. Id.at 1286-87.
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representing the New York companies because their representation "would
create too great a danger" that Maritrans' confidences would be
divulged. 95 Such disclosures would "irreparably" injure Maritrans'
position, and any damages award would be an inadequate
competitive
96
remedy.1
Whether Maritranswas correctly decided is a matter of perspective. 97
From Maritrans' perspective, its labor practices helped it succeed in a
highly competitive business. Maritrans was probably pleased by the
prospect of its competitors enduring a long strike. At the very least, it
would not want to reduce the chance of the New York union striking its
competitors. Pepper's and Messina's representation of Maritrans'
competitors at a crucial time was the equivalent of treason. "Parking"
Bouchard and Eklof with Pentima was dishonest. From Pepper's and
Messina's perspective, Maritrans' complaints must have appeared to be an
attempt to bully them, or to hold the fimn hostage. They were entitled to
market their marine labor law expertise. Indeed, all law firms rely on their
reputation and expertise in particular practice areas to lure new clients.
They did not divulge client confidences. 9 The New York companies were
not dealing with the same union.

195. Id. at 1287.
196. See id.
197. Professor Thomas D. Morgan, an ethics scholar who has studied Maritrans,essentially
shares my analysis of the parties' perspectives, though he deemphasizes Messina's decision to
"park" two competitors with an attorney who his firm intended to hire. See Thomas D. Morgan,
Maritrans v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, ALAS LOSS PREVENTION.J., Sept. 1993, at 2,2 (on file
with author).
198. The problem with this perspective is that courts seldom inquire into whether the attorney
has actually used the confidential information to the client's detriment or disadvantage. Such an
inquiry would reveal the very information for which protection is sought. See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun.
Sch., 43 F.3d 1373, 1384 n.8 (10th Cir. 1994); H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Bros., 280 Cal.
Rptr. 614, 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Chrispens v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 897 P.2d 104,115
(Kan. 1995); Sullivan County Reg'l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town ofAcworth, 686 A.2d 755,75758 (N.H. 1996); State v. Crepeault, 704 A.2d 778, 783 (Vt. 1997); State ex reL McClanahan v.
Hamilton, 430 S.E.2d 569,573-74 (W. Va. 1993). It would also be very difficult for a former client
to demonstrate that the attorney revealed the client's confidences to the client's detriment. See
Henderson v. Floyd, 891 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1995). Therefore, once the potential for disclosure
of confidential information is shown, a breach of confidence is presumed. See Griffen v. East
Prairie, Mo. Reorganized Sch. Dist., 945 F. Supp. 1251,1254 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Henriksen v. Great
Am. Say. & Loan, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Bergeron v. Mackler, 623 A.2d
489, 494 (Conn. 1993); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630, 634 (Fla. 1991);
Richers v. Marsh & McLennan Group Assocs., 459 N.W.2d 478,481 (Iowa 1990); Chrispens,897
P.2d at 114; Sullivan County, 686 A.2d at 758; Crepeault,704 A.2d at 783; McClanahan,430
S.E.2d at 573. Some courts go further to impute the disclosure of the former client's confidences
to other lawyers in the subject lawyer's firm, thus disqualifying the entire firm. See, e.g., Flatt v.
Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 954 (Cal. 1994); Bechtold v. Gomez, 576 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Neb.
1998); National Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123, 131 (Tex. 1996).
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There are several problems with Maritrans.First, the court reasoned
that clients have a right to "feel secure" that their confidences will be
safeguarded."' This is at best an imprecise standard.2 ' Second, if a client
can effectively prevent a lawyer from representing a competitor because of
what the lawyer might tell the competitor, it becomes extraordinarily
difficult for a lawyer to have multiple clients in the same industry. That
flies in the face of modem legal specialization.01 Third, the more rights an
existing client has to object to its attorneys' representation of new clients,
the greater its control over its attorneys.202 Theoretically,an existing client
can effectively extort concessions (perhaps by way of fee arrangements)
from its attorneys in exchange for the client's consent to new engagements.
This threatens lawyers' professional independence. Fourth, Pepper and
Messina did not violate Rule 1.7(b). Whether they violated Rule 1.9(a)203
is an open question, resolved against them by assuming that once they
stopped representing Maritrans, their representation of the New York
companies was a substantially related matter and was materially adverse
to Maritrans. While ethics rules should not be turned "into a grant of civil
immunity," 204 they afford a more reasonable standard of conduct than a
client's subjective feeling of security. Even then clients should not be able
to wield them as procedural weapons in order to gain a personal or
competitive advantage.
Maritransis a curious decision best limited to its facts,2 5 as evidenced
by subsequent courts' careful scrutiny of the case. 2' Nevertheless, it
should cause attorneys to consider and evaluate issue or positional
conflicts of interest. Pepper ultimately settled Maritransfor $3,000,000.207

199. Maritrans,602 A.2d at 1283.
200. See Morgan, supra note 193, at 6.
201. Seeki.
202. See id.
203. See MODELRULES, supranote 16, Rule 1.9(a). Rule 1.9(a) provides: "A lawyer who has
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same
or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation." Id.
204. Maritrans,602 A.2d at 1283.
205. For another discussion of Maritrans,see Geraldine Rowe, Comment, Maritrans G.P. Inc.
v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz: Is Economic CompetitionEnough to Createa Conflict ofInterest?,
8 GEO. J. LEGALEThiCS 1171 (1995).
206. See, e.g., Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Graphix Hot Line, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1200, 12071208 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (discussing client consent).
207. See Morgan, supra note 193, at 6.
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IV. A PRACnCAL ANALYSIS OF ISSUE OR
PosmONAL CONFLiCTS OF INTEREST
Lawyers must be able to recognize issue or positional conflicts of
interest, analyze them, and avoid them. This Part starts with the
proposition that former clients should not be permitted to raise issue or
positional conflicts of interest, i.e., such conflicts should not be recognized
in successive representations. It next analyzes issue or positional conflicts
in concurrent representations, and takes up the issues of disclosure and
client consent. Finally, this Part combines the test for issue or positional
conflicts with a discussion of client consent, packaging the analysis as a
practitioner must.
A. FornerClients and Successive Representations
In order for competing interests to become an actual "conflict of
interest" as that term is used in the Model Rules or understood by lawyers
and courts, they must "materially limit" or "materially interfere" with a
lawyer's representation of a present client."' That should not happen in
successive representations when the claimed conflict is of an issue or
positional nature. Stated most simply, former clients should not be
permitted to claim the existence of true issue or positional conflicts of
interest. Such conflicts should not be recognized in successive
representations for both practical and policy reasons.2"
First, from a practical perspective, successive representations do not in
and of themselves threaten client confidences. The preservation of clients'
confidences is, of course, the paramount concern in successive
representations. Second, absent the use of client confidences or the use of
client information, successive representations do not offend principles of
loyalty. Service to a client in a single matter or several matters does not
bind client and lawyer forever. Clients are free to change lawyers, and
lawyers are similarly free to take on new clients in their areas of
specialization.210 Third, taking opposing positions in successive
representations does not impair a lawyer's effectiveness for the present
client. If anything, the present client benefits from the lawyer's first-hand
knowledge of the opposing position. This is true without regard for
whether the lawyer obtains specialized or confidential information in the

208. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7(b) & cmt. 4.
209. Not all commentators and scholars share this opinion. See, e.g., Dzienkowski, supranote

2, at 526-27 (noting limited instances in which positional conflicts can arise out of successive
representations); Spaulding, supra note 8, at 1406.
210. But see Daniel J. Pope & Stephanie J. Kim, Switching Sides: May a Lawyer Ever
Represent Someone Against a FormerClient?,65 DEF. COUNs. J. 553, 554 (1998) (asserting that

"although clients may be less than loyal at times, lawyers must not").
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first representation. In the litigation context, a lawyer's change of position
should not render him less effective in the eyes of a court or judge; courts
and judges understand that lawyers are advocates for their clients, and that
clients and interests change.21' In the lobbying context, legislators and
governmental bodies surely understand that the lawyers who lobby them
are advocating their clients' interests rather than their own. Finally,
screening for issue or positional conflicts involving former clients is a
formidable task even for large and sophisticated law firms. If it is difficult
for firms to screen issue or positional conflicts among or between current
clients,2" it is practically impossible for them to do so when former
clients' interests are implicated. Given the myriad of other reasons that
issue or positional conflicts should not be credited in successive
representations, it is unreasonable to require lawyers and law firms to go
to the considerable time and expense of trying to develop systems for their
detection, especially since those systems are probably going to be
unworkable.
From a policy standpoint, allowing former clients to raise pure issue or
positional conflicts gives them unreasonable and unjustifiable control over
the attorneys who once served them. Giving former clients veto power over
lawyers' choices of new clients and new matters absent threats to
confidentiality or the exploitation of information obtained from the former
client robs lawyers of their professional independence. Attorneys can be
forced to forego new representations, and suffer financially as a result,
while former clients pay nothing to maintain a perceived advantage or
favored position. Allowing former clients to raise issue or positional
conflicts, and thus allowing them to restrict lawyers' acceptance of new
cases, interferes with the strong social policy favoring persons' right to
counsel of their choice by limiting the number of available lawyers. This
is particularly true where the pool of available lawyers is already quite
small because the challenged representation is especially complex or
demanding, because it requires lawyers with special skills or expertise, or
because the parties reside in a smaller community with few practicing
lawyers.
If issue or positional conflicts of interest can be credited in successive
representations, it is in those states that require attorneys to conduct
themselves so as to avoid even an "appearance of impropriety." The
appearance of impropriety standard is found in Canon 9 of the Model

211. The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility impliedly
acknowledged this in its analysis of issue or positional conflicts. See Formal Op. 93-377, supra note
48.
212. See StateBar ofCal., Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op.
No. 1989-108 (1989) (branding the detection of issue or positional conflicts of interest bylaw firms
"virtually impossible").
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Code.2 13 Under EC 9-6, a lawyer should "conduct himself so as to reflect
credit on the legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect, and
trust of his clients and of the public; and to strive to avoid not only
'
professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety."214
The appearance of impropriety standard obviously remains a measure
of attorneys' conduct in those states that still follow the Model Code, 215 but
it may be found elsewhere. Some states have written the requirement that
lawyers avoid the appearance of impropriety into their versions of the
Model Rules. 2 6 A few states have superimposed the standard onto the
Model Rules217 even though a comment to Rule 1.9 expressly rejects the
appearance of impropriety as a rubric for resolving attorney
disqualification debates.218
The appearance of impropriety standard is seriously flawed. First, even
those jurisdictions that employ the standard acknowledge that it "is vague
and leads to uncertain results." 219 Because the term "impropriety" is
undefined, embracing the "appearance of impropriety" as a basis for
judging lawyers' conduct is "question-begging." 220 Second, the appearance
of impropriety standard does not adequately consider the relationship
between the subjects of the current and former representations.221 Third,
the appearance of impropriety standard may be so broad as to include any
new representation that may "make a former client feel anxious."' If so,
lawyers may be disqualified from subsequent representations or may be
forced to forgo new representations based on nothing more than a former
client's subjective beliefjudgment or perception." For these reasons and
perhaps others, the appearance of impropriety is "'too weak and too
slender a reed"' upon which to premise attorneys' disqualification in

213. See MODEL CODE, supra note 21, Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the
Appearance of Professional Impropriety.").
214. l EC 9-6.
215. See, e.g., State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Hickman, 512 N.W.2d 374,378 (Neb. 1994).
216. See State v. Irizarry, 639 A.2d 305,314 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (quoting New
Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(c)(2)).
217. See, e.g., First Am. Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669, 671-72 (Ark. 1990);
Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466,468-69 (Ky. 1997).
218. See MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.9 cm. 5.
219. Lovell, 941 S.W.2d at 469.
220. MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.9 cmt. 5.
221. See Schwartz v. Cortelloni, 685 N.E.2d 871, 878 (M1. 1997).
222. MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.9 cmt. 5.
223. See id. The Kentucky Supreme Courtreasons thatthe appearanceof impropriety standard
serves the "useful function" of protecting both current and former clients' "reasonable
expectations." Lovell, 941 S.W.2d at469. Though theuse of the qualifier"reasonable" suggests that
a client's reasonable expectations are objectively determined, the standard is still too dependent
upon former clients' subjective beliefs, judgments or perspectives to be valid or useful.
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successive representations."
The fundamental question in Model Code states and in those
jurisdictions that otherwise enforce the appearance of impropriety standard
is whether successive representations can spawn issue or positional
conflicts of interest. Is there something about the standard that changes the
analysis? The answer should be no. The practical and policy reasons for
rejecting issue or positional conflicts in successive representations
discussed earlier remain valid. The appearance of impropriety standard,
amorphous though it may be, is linked in the Model Code to improper
judicial or public influence,' and to the preservation and protection of
clients' funds and property.226 Pure issue or positional conflicts do not
implicate these concerns. Former clients cannot reasonably expect lawyers
to forever obey their wishes. There is, in sum, no reason to acknowledge
or recognize issue or positional conflicts of interest in successive
representations under the Model Code, or under any other regulatory
framework that considers the appearance of impropriety.
B. CurrentClients and ConcurrentRepresentations
Issue or positional conflicts of interest can only arise out of concurrent
representations. It is in this context that issue or positional conflicts may
diminish lawyers' effectiveness 2 7 and materially limit one or both clients'
representations. Rule 1.7(b), which provides that a lawyer generally "shall
not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or... by the
lawyer's own interests," '2 must be read as prohibiting issue or positional
conflicts of interest in concurrent representations. 9 Such an interpretation
is necessary to protect clients.2 °
The problem with applying Rule 1.7(b) is the language of the rule itself.
It is neither specific nor directive, and it arguably allows lawyers such
broad discretion that issue or positional conflicts can easily be rationalized
away.231 It is therefore important to develop an analytical framework for
recognizing and understanding issue or positional conflicts. Scholars have
proposed two tests: one by Professors Hazard and Hodes, and another by

224. Schwartz, 685 N.E.2d at 878 (quoting Index Futures Group, Inc. v. Street, 516 N.E.2d
890, 894 (Il1.App. Ct. 1987)).
225. See MODELCODE, supra note 21, DR 9-101.
226. See id. DR 9-102.
227. See Formal Op. 93-377, supra note 48.
228. MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
229. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 475.
230. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:104, at 232.4.
231. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 475.
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Professor Dzienkowski.232
Professors Hazard and Hodes identify four factors that can affect the
seriousness of an issue or positional conflict under Model Rule 1.7(b):
(1) whether the lawyer has "special knowledge" of the first client's
business that is detailed and specific to that client; 233 (2) whether the
subject of the alleged conflict is "central" or critical to both clients; 3 4
(3) whether the issue is purely legal, or whether the representations turn on
factual distinctions; 235 and (4) whether the clients frequently litigate the
issue, such that they have long-term interests in how it is decided in any
particular case.2 36 Professor Dzienkowski also advocates a four-part test for
evaluating issue or positional conflicts. He would examine (1) the
directness of the legal conflict and its importance to the representations of
both clients; (2) the existence of confidential information obtained from
the first client that may be relevant to the second representation, and the
likelihood that the lawyer will have to reveal or use the confidential
information to that client's detriment; (3) the likelihood and magnitude of
the injury to the clients from their common lawyer's concurrent
representations; and (4) the existence of special factors that may affect the
clients' expectations of loyalty on a particular legal issue.237
These approaches are interesting because their sponsors attempt to
factor in the possible use of a client's information or confidences to its
detriment or disadvantage. Of course, the use of client information and the
disclosure of client confidences are generally prohibited. 238 But the
existence of an issue or positional conflict does not depend on client
confidences being jeopardized. 9 Such conflicts can arise without regard
for and wholly apart from the improper use of client information. How
critical, then, is this element? Is it truly a factor in conflict of interest
analysis, or does it simply alert lawyers scrutinizing concurrent
representations to other possible ethics violations?
232. See id.at 479, 508-509.
233. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:105, at 232.6.
234. Id.
235. See id. § 1.7:106, at 232.9.
236. See id.
237. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 509.
238. See MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.8(b) (stating that a lawyer "shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client
consents after consultation, except as permitted or required by Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3"); MODEL
RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.6(a) (providing that a lawyer "shall not reveal information relating
to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in [Rule
1.6(b)]").
239. This is true even though issue or positional conflicts often overlap with confidentiality
concerns. See, e.g.,WestinghouseElec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7thCir. 1978);
Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
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There are no clear answers to these questions.'
In certain
circumstances a lawyer's knowledge of one client's confidences may
materially limit his representation of another client, while in others the
impermissible use of or disclosure of client information will be a separate
violation of the lawyer's professional duties. In still other representations
a threat to a client's confidences or special information may simply be an
aggravating factor that causes the client to claim an issue or positional
conflict of interest where it would not otherwise. Because the existence of
an issue or positional conflict does not depend on the involvement of
confidential information, however, this factor will seldom be a primary
consideration. If and when client confidences or information are a
consideration, they will almost always be secondary. For example, once a
lawyer determines that an issue or positional conflict exists, the question
may become whether it can be cured by client consent.2"' A lawyer's
knowledge of a client's confidences may prohibit the disclosures necessary
to obtain consent,242 or it may make the conflict so acute that the lawyer
cannot request consent.243
Professor Dzienkowski would have lawyers weigh "the existence of
special factors" that may affect their "expectations about loyalty to a
particular legal issue." 2' Such factors may include "whether the client
notifies the lawyer that the client feels very strongly about [this] legal
issue" and "the client's right to know that the lawyer has advanced or is
advancing inconsistent legal positions... "245 These factors are essentially
meaningless for professional responsibility purposes. The strength of a
client's feelings may cause a lawyer to decline a representation for
business or personal reasons, but it has little to do with a lawyer's duties
under Rule 1.7(b). A client's "right to know" is an independent concern.
A lawyer has an ethical obligation to reveal to a client possible issue or
positional conflicts at the outset of the representation.246
The test for whether an issue or positional conflict of interest exists

240. The scholars who advocate consideration of client confidentiality issues offer no clear
guidance. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 512-14; 1 HAZARD & HODES, supranote 7, § 1.7:105,
at 232.6.
241. See MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
242. See id. cmt. 5 (asserting that "there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make
the disclosure necessary to obtain [client] consent").
243. See I HAZARD&HODES, supranote 7, § 1.7:301, at 250 (stating that even under the more
forgiving analysis of Model Rule 1.7(b) there are some cases in which client consent should not
even be sought).
244. Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 509.
245. Id. at 519.
246. See MODELRuIEs, supra note 16, Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.").
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requires affirmative answers to three questions, of which the first two are
closely related and must be considered together. First, is the issue critically
important to both representations? Second, will the determination of the
issue in one case affect its determination in the other representation? These
first two questions and their answers are sure to be intertwined. Third, will
the competing important interests materially limit the lawyer's
representation of one or both clients? This test tracks the current ABA
approach to issue or positional conflicts. u7
1. The Importance of the Issue and Its Determination
Not every set of contrary or contradictory legal arguments can be seen
as creating an issue or positional conflict of interest. Not all competing
interests require lawyers to decline or withdraw from representations.
Lawyers must be free to argue or advance divergent positions. 4 Clients
must not be able to veto other representations out of groundless fear, or
based on mere disapproval. At the same time, clients must enjoy some
protection. They must have some right to veto their lawyers' ability to
speak with different voices. The balance is thus one of importance and
effect.
There is no uniform standard for measuring the importance of an issue.
An issue may be dispositive in a single case, or it may grow in importance
because a client has a long-term stake in the subject. Measuring an issue's
importance, and evaluating the effect that its determination in one
representation will have on another, require analysis of the conflicting
legal principles and the factual similarities of the two representations.4 9
Using litigation as an example, it may be that the two representations
involve very close or nearly identical factual situations with legal
arguments that are directly contrary. If so, and if the cases are pending in
the same jurisdiction, the potential conflict should be obvious. If the cases
will be litigated in different jurisdictions the conflict may be less apparent,
but it may be no less serious. Courts often look to other jurisdictions to
decide difficult issues or issues of first impression. A lawyer who finds
himself in such a situation must study the law in both jurisdictions to
assess the importance of the issue and its potential impact on the
representations. 25°
If there are significant factual differences between the two
247. See Formal Op. 93-377, supra note 48, at 4-5. See generallysupra text accompanying
supra notes 48-67.
248. Indeed, the ability to argue both sides of the same proposition may be the hallmark of
detached professionals. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:106, at 232.7-.9.
249. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 510.
250. The same principle applies regardless of whether the cases are pending in federal or state
courts.
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representations, there may be no conflict at all. Factual differences may
make an issue critical to one representation irrelevant in the other. Factual
differences may mean that an issue, while important, ought to be decided
differently in the two representations. Alternatively, factual differences
may actually create an issue or positional conflict if they force a lawyer to
recharacterize a legal issue to the detriment of one or both clients. 1
Potential lobbying conflicts require similar analysis. There, as in
litigation, lawyers must be concerned about decisions made by thirdparties.
In the transactional context, it may matter that the lawyer actually
conceived the document or provision at issue, as compared to using a form
document or standard clause. A lawyer's originality and ingenuity surely
increase the actual or potential importance of his work. Certainly, the
lawyer should not attack a similar arrangement in an unrelated
representation. Where transactional work and litigation overlap, particular
concepts may be declared invalid across the board, thereby increasing the
importance of the issue while affecting multiple representations.
Negotiations with different groups in the same industry may affect several
representations, dulling competitive edges or reducing clients' perceived
business advantages. 2
The fact that the clients face an issue repeatedly undoubtedly increases
its importance. Clients with long-term stakes in an industry or area of law
cannot afford continuing threats to their positions. This is true in litigation,
in transactional work, and in the lobbying context.
2. Material Limitation
The great concern about issue or positional conflicts is that they will
impair the effectiveness of the lawyer involved-the conflict will
materially limit the lawyer's representation of one or both clients."
Lawyers must be careful not to underestimate this threat.2 4
An issue or positional conflict may cause a lawyer to "soft-pedal" the
issue in one or both representations, or it may force the lawyer to alter his
arguments to one or both clients' detriment." A lawyer may be unable or
unwilling to advance the issue for both clients with equal zeal. A lawyer

251. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7, § 1.7:106, at 232.7-.9.
252. See, e.g., Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
See supra text accompanying notes 158-203.
253. See Formal Op. 93-377, supra note 48, at 4-5.
254. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 515; see also 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7,
§ 1.7:105, at 232.6 (arguing that "any lawyer who claims he would be wholly uninfluenced by
[issue or positional conflicts] is deluding himself and his clients").
255. See Formal Op. 93-377, supra note 48, at4; see also 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 7,
§ 1.7:105, at 232.5-.7 (providing an example of issue or positional conflict in the present context).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

might urge a client to settle a matter that he typically would counsel the
client to try were it not for the conflict. It does not matter whether lawyers
make such decisions consciously, or arrive at them subconsciously. What
matters is the material limitation on one or both representations.
Consider the situation where Lawyer L regularly represents a number
of insurance companies. The general counsel of a local corporation calls
L and tells him that the corporation's insurer wrongly refused to defend it
in a close case. The corporation wants L to sue the insurer for breach of
contract and bad faith. L does not represent the subject insurer. He believes
that a sound argument can be made to expand the scope of insurers' duty
to defend in the jurisdiction.
L's current insurance company clients probably are indifferent with
respect to the outcome of this particular matter, but they undoubtedly have
set positions on the law surrounding the duty to defend. L may
subconsciously favor his insurance clients' interests over the corporation's
interests. He may urge the corporation to pursue only its contract claims
rather than any related tort claims, thus reducing its potential recovery. L
may counsel the corporation to prematurely settle the case, or he may
negotiate a lower settlement than is reasonable under the circumstances.
He may not pursue certain avenues of discovery for fear that his innovative
approaches or theories will expose his insurance company clients to similar
inquiries in subsequent cases.
Such risks cannot be underestimated. Though L may downplay it, there
is no denying his interest in maintaining his relationships with his
insurance company clients. A disinterested observer could reasonably
conclude that L's representation of his insurance company clients will
materially limit his representation of the corporation.
A material limitation may not be so obvious. Suppose, for example,
that a lawyer drafts a particular document or a key provision, or structures
a transaction in an especially creative way. Might not the lawyer's pride of
authorship, or his pride in his transactional creation, prevent his critical
analysis of similar
situations for other clients in unrelated
6
representations?1
C. Disclosure and Client Consent
An attorney may have a duty to disclose potential issue or positional
conflicts of interest to prospective clients. A lawyer's duty to disclose may
first be found in Model Rule 1.4. Model Rule 1.4(b) provides: "A lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. ' s7 Rule

256. See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 511.
257. MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.4(b).
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1.4(b) imposes a positive duty to communicate. A lawyer has a duty to
volunteer information, and to provide the client with all information
necessary for the client to make informed decisions concerning the
objectives of the representation and the means by which they will be
pursued." A lawyer must disclose and explain information in a way that
fulfills the client's reasonable expectations for information, and must do
so consistent with his duty to act in the client's best interests. 259
"A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict," as
Rule 1.7(b) makes clear. 2 ' But such consent can only come after
"consultation," which requires the lawyer to explain the matter with such
thoroughness and clarity that the client can appreciate and understand the
significance of the potential conflict. 261 The lawyer must disclose the
implications and risks of the concurrent representations.262 Where there is
no consultation there can be no consent.263 Moreover, a lawyer facing a
potential issue or positional conflict of interest cannot limit his disclosure
and consultation to the newest client. The lawyer must consult with both
clients so that each can determine whether it should consent to the lawyer's
dual representation. 26
There are, of course, circumstances in which clients should not consent
to lawyers' dual representation. Perhaps more importantly, a lawyer
sometimes may be prohibited from seeking client consent. Under Rule 1.7,
a lawyer cannot ask for client consent "when a disinterested lawyer would
conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances....
Lawyers may try to head off potential issues or positional conflicts of
interest by way of advance consent. A lawyer might advise all clients that
he will in the future represent clients with divergent views, and request that
the clients waive any potential issue or positional conflicts. Indeed, the
impetus for prospective conflict waivers has grown as law firms have
opened multiple offices and corporate clients increasingly spread their
business among several firms.2

258. See id. at cmt. I.
259. See id. at cmt. 2.
260. Id. at Rule 1.7(b).
261. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-372, at 2-3
(1993) [hereinafter Formal Op. 93-372].
262. See MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7(b)(2).
263. See, e.g., Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 845 (D.C. 1994); Conrad Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Rood, 862 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Ky. 1993).
264. See Griva, 637 A.2d at 845; see also MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7 cmt. 5
("When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each
client.").
265. MODELRULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.7 cmt. 5.
266. See Formal Op. 93-372, supra note 261, at 2.
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The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility tepidly approved prospective waivers in a 1993 opinion.267
In Formal Opinion 93-372, the Committee held that "a lawyer may ask for,
and a client may give, a waiver of objection to a possible future
representation presenting a conflict of interest ... ,,26' A prospective
waiver must, however, meet all the requirements of a contemporaneous
waiver and it must contemplate the particular future conflict "with
sufficient clarity so [that] the client's consent can reasonably be viewed as
having been fully informed when it was given."'269 This may be an exacting
standard, as Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc.,270
demonstrates.
In Worldspan, the plaintiffs moved to disqualify defense counsel in
active tort litigation.27 ' The defense attorneys' law firm represented the
plaintiffs in state tax matters in Georgia and Tennessee for several years.272
The case at bar and the tax matters all involved in different ways and
degrees the plaintiffs' computer airline reservations operation.273 The
critical issue presented to the Worldspan court was whether the plaintiffs
had given their informed consent to the law firm's simultaneous, dual
representation. 274
The attorneys argued that the court should not disqualify them because
the plaintiff had prospectively consented to the representation by way of
the firm's standard engagement letter sent in 1992, some five years
earlier. 275 That engagement letter provided:
"As we have discussed, because of the relatively large size
of our firm and our representation of many other clients, it is
possible that there may arise in the future a dispute between
another client and WORLDSPAN, or a transaction in which
WORLDSPAN's interests do not coincide with those of
another client. In order to distinguish those instances in which
WORLDSPAN consents to our representing such other
clients from those instances in which such consent is not
given, you have agreed, as a condition to our undertaking this
engagement, that during the period of this engagement we
will not be precluded from representing clients who may have

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See id.
Id. at 1.
Id.
5 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
See id. at 1357.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1358.

275. See id.
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interests adverse to WORLDSPAN so long as (1) such
adverse matter is not substantially related to our work for
WORLDSPAN, and (2) our representation of the other client
does not involve the use, to the disadvantage of
WORLDSPAN, of confidential information of
WORLDSPAN we have obtained as a result of representing
WORLDSPAN.
'We have advised you that we have served as special
counsel to Delta Air Lines for certain types of matters,
including state and local tax matters. We do not view our
work for Delta to be in conflict with our representation of
WORLDSPAN, and Delta . . . has consented to our
representation of WORLDSPAN. We have also advised you
that we have represented American Airlines. We do not
believe our representation of American Airlines is in conflict
with our representation of WORLDSPAN. We have also
represented various other airlines from time-to-time on
limited matters.., we do not view our representation of any
of these carriers to be in conflict
276 with our proposed
representation of WORLDSPAN.
The engagement letter concluded with an invitation to the plaintiffs to call
the lawyer who wrote it if the representations in the letter were inconsistent
with the plaintiffs' understanding of the terms of the engagement.277
There was disagreement over the response to the engagement letter.278
The attorneys contended that the plaintiffs did not respond, such that the
representation proceeded in accordance with the letter's terms. 279 The
plaintiffs contended that their house counsel immediately objected, but that
the lawyer responsible for their matters at the law firm refused to alter the
terms of the engagement.2 0 The firm's representation of the plaintiffs
simply continued notwithstanding plaintiffs' apprehension.28 '
The court resisted the litigants' invitations to weigh the credibility of
the plaintiffs' house counsel and the firm's lawyer involved, finding such
a determination unnecessary. 2 2 The court focused instead on the language
of the engagement letter, which it found to be ambiguous. 23 Nothing in the
letter foreshadowed the directly adverse litigation at issue. 284

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 1359 (quoting engagement letter).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1359-60.
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[F] uture directly adverse litigation against one's present client
is a matter of such an entirely different quality and
exponentially greater magnitude, and so unusual given the
position of trust existing between lawyer and client, that any
document intended to grant standing consent for the lawyer to
litigate against his own client must identify that possibility, if
not in plain language, at least by irresistible inference
including reference to specific parties, the circumstances
under which such adverse representation would be
undertaken, and all relevant like information.2 5
The Worldspan court believed that this reasoning carried extra weight
where, as in the case before it, the future conflict is caused by undertaking
the representation of a client with whom a law firm has no present
relationship. 286 The court disqualified the defense attorneys, 2 7 denied their
motion for reconsideration, and refused to certify the matter for an
interlocutory appeal.288
Worldspan may not be persuasive in the case of issue or positional
conflicts because it involved direct adversity. The case does, however,
point out certain problems or risks attending advance consent. First, a
client cannot be deemed to consent to a representation without a complete
appreciation and understanding of the risks involved. A client's consent
29
will rarely be fully informed where the conflict waiver is prospective.
Second, prospective conflict waivers reduce clients' trust in their lawyers
and diminish public trust in the legal system. 2' For these reasons they are
suspect and are subject to strictjudicial scrutiny. Third, the reasonableness
and validity of a client's consent must be judged on a case-by-case basis.
Circumstances may change between the time a lawyer secures a
prospective waiver and the time he accepts the second representation. Even
if they do not, the lawyer still must determine whether accepting the
second representation will adversely affect the first client's
representation.29 These problems or risks are present in the context of
issue or positional conflicts; 292 they are not limited to cases of direct
adversity.

285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 1360.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1360-64.
See Formal Op. 93-372, supranote 261, at 6.
See Worldspan, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1360, 1363.
See Formal Op. 93-372, supranote 261, at 5.
See Dzienkowski, supra note 2, at 528-29.
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D. ConcurrentRepresentations,Conflicts and
Consent: PuttingIt All Together
If a lawyer reasonably believes that the concerning issue is not critically
important to both representations, or if its determination in one case will
not affect its determination in the other, there is no conflict of interest.293
Must the lawyer volunteer to his clients that he has considered the issue
and determined that there is no conflict? In a word, no. To impose such a
disclosure requirement on lawyers would strain Rules 1.4 and 1.7 beyond
reason. If one of the clients asks the lawyer whether he has considered
possible conflicts, however, the lawyer must respond truthfully.294
If the issue is critically important to both representations, or if its
determination in one case will affect its determination in the other, the
lawyer must then determine whether the clients' competing interests will
materially limit the representation of either client. If so, the lawyer must
decline the second representation. 95 If the lawyer makes this determination
after both representations are underway, he must withdraw from at least
one of them.2" In this situation the lawyer cannot ask the clients to consent
to the dual representation; this conflict cannot be waived."9
If the lawyer believes that his representation of either client will not be
materially limited notwithstanding the importance of the issue or the
possible impact of its determination, the lawyer may proceed with both
representations.29 In order to so proceed, however, both clients must
consent to the dual representation after full disclosure and consultation.2, 9
It may be possible for lawyers to avoid issue or positional conflicts by
way of advance consent. First, any prospective waiver should be in
writing.' The writing requirement is important because it is the only way
for the lawyer to demonstrate that the client's consent to the ultimate dual
representation was unequivocal. Second, the client's consent should be
specific. 01 The document granting consent should specifically refer to
litigation if consent is to be effective there, and it should also specifically
refer to any other context in which a conflict may arise. The document
should identify potential opposing parties with respect to whom consent is

293. See MODELRUiS, supra note 16, Rule 1.7(b).
294. See MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.4(a) (requiring a lawyer to comply with a
client's reasonable requests for information); MODEL RULES, supra note 16, Rule 1.4 cmt. 4 ("A
lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience.").
295. See Formal Op. 93-377, supra note 48, at 4.
296. See id.at 4.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.

300. See Formal Op. 93-372, supranote 261, at 7.
301. See id. at 5.
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sought, or it at least should identify the class of potential competing
clients. 3" The document should also express the potential effect on the
client attributable to future issue or positional conflicts. 3 Third, it may
help to periodically review the engagement letter or other written waiver.
The staleness of the engagement letter in Worldspanapparently influenced
the court's decision to reject its terms.30" Finally, and critically, the lawyer
must fully satisfy his disclosure and communication obligations under
Rules 1.4 and 1.7 when obtaining the original client's advance consent.
V. CONCLUSION

Issue or positional conflicts of interest pose a serious professional
responsibility threat to lawyers in all practice areas, although they are most
likely to arise in litigation. Unfortunately, these conflicts have received
scant scholarly attention and courts have seldom been called upon to
analyze them. Practitioners thus have little guidance in this area.
Issue or positional conflicts of interest should be recognized only in
concurrent representations. In order to determine how to proceed when
presented with a potential conflict of this sort, a lawyer must analyze: (1)
whether the issue is critically important to both representations; (2)
whether the determination of the issue in one case will affect its
determination in the other; and (3) whether the competing important issues
will materially limit the lawyer's representation of one or both clients.
Under certain circumstances clients may waive issue or positional
conflicts, and they may even be able to do so prospectively.
Lawyers must learn to recognize, analyze and avoid issue or positional
conflicts of interest in order to prevent disqualification, disciplinary
charges and litigation with aggrieved clients. Clients must be sensitive to
issue or positional conflicts so that they can avoid the hardship that
accompanies the disqualification of trusted counsel and, more importantly,
so that they can protect their interests before they are ever threatened.

302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See Worldspan, L.P. v. Sabre Group Holdings, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1358 (N.D. Ga.
1998).
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